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I. ONE PILL MAKES YOU SMALL
This Article begins, as do so many other works of legal scholarship, with a
story.' Imagine a wonder plant teeming with extraordinary chemical properties.
Like most living organisms in a diverse but fragile biosphere, it is native to one
of the many poor countries of the global south. The local population and
* Cf STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH... AND IT'S A GOOD THING Too (1994).
** Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School <chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu>. At the risk of failing to mention other faculty members who showed me
such warm hospitality during my stay as a Distinguished Speaker at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law, from January 18-19, 2005, I wish to thank Michael S. Mireles and Jed Scully. Special thanks to
Kathleen Chen.
1. Compare, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993), with, e.g., Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REv. 665 (1993).
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professional botanists agree that the wonder plant deserves the title of "village
pharmacy."2 The developing country where this wonder plant is native supplies
both the genetic material and the ethnobiological knowledge that an American
life sciences company uses to develop pesticides, antiseptics, and even
contraceptives. One product in particular, a pesticide and insect repellant, is
markedly more stable and effective than traditional formulations known to and
used by farmers in the source country. The American company proceeds to
patent the new pesticide. The company not only fails to compensate the source
country; it also asserts patent rights in this pesticide and other products developed
from that wonder plant and traditional knowledge of its uses. In other words, the
company stands in position to collect a patent-driven premium from the very
villagers who informed it of the wonder plant's properties and who helped
harvest the company's first samples of the plant.
Writers of fiction are repeatedly told to draw the elements of their craft from real
life. So too with this slightly more fact-driven version of storytelling. W.R. Grace's
encounter with India's neem tree (Azadirachta indica) neatly fits this narrative.3
Approaching this story in notoriety is that of Eli Lilly & Company's derivation of
vinblastine and vincristine, two cancer-fighting alkaloids, from the rosy periwinkle
(Catharanthus roseus, formerly classified as Vinca rosea)." Vinblastine is used in
treating Hodgkin's disease,5 while vincristine has become the drug of choice for
treating childhood leukemia.6 Though neem and the periwinkle deserve more
airspace, I shall offer a third story as the paradigmatic tale of alleged northern greed
and southern victimhood in the global debate over biodiversity, biotechnology, and
the proper relationship between the environmental protection, technological
innovation, and social justice.
The United States has literally gotten fat. In this Malthusian world,7 references to
food security as an apology for American agricultural policies that constrict
production and raise producer prices are nothing short of obscene.' "Only a nation
that is obscenely rich by the West's historical standards and the larger world's
2. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 285 (1993).
3. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEEM: A TREE FOR SOLVING GLOBAL PROBLEMS (1992).
4. See, e.g., Richard Stone, The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora's Box or Fair Deal?, 256 SCIENCE 1624
(1992); Christopher J. Hunter, Comment, Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using Private Contracts and International
Legal Principles and Policies to Conserve Raw Medical Materials, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129, 130 (1999).
5. See Richard Little et al., Vinblastine for Recurrent Hodgkin's Disease Following Autologous Bone
Marrow Transplant, 16 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 584 (1998).
6. See A.J. Veerman et al., High Cure Rate with a Moderately Intensive Treatment Regimen in Non-High-
Risk Childhood Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia: Results of Protocol ALL VI from the Dutch Childhood Leukemia
Study Group, 14 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 911 (1996).
7. See generally Luther Tweeten, Dodging a Malthusian Bullet in the 21st Century, 14 AGRIBUSINESS 15
(1998) (assessing the prospects for global food security in next 100 years); Symposium, Malthus, Mendel, and
Monsanto: Intellectual Property and the Law and Politics of Global Food Supply, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LMIG. 397
(2004).
8. See Guadalupe T. Luna, The New Deal and Food Insecurity in the "Midst of Plenty," 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 213 (2004) (discussing domestic food supply policy during the last period of serious food insecurity in American
history).
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contemporary standards can indulge in food aid either as a means of suppressing
domestic supplies or as a tool for shaping foreign relations, much less both."9 The
real public health crisis in America and other wealthy nations is not starvation, but
obesity.'1 The prescription for this societal pathology is actually quite simple."
Americans should eat less and exercise more. Having experienced a shocking
increase of 26 years in life expectancy over the course of a mere 75 years of
comprehensive food and drug regulation, however, American society as a whole
evidently expects to continue the twentieth century's unprecedented and probably
unrepeatable actuarial leap forward through pharmaceutical wizardry. 12 In other
words, we would sooner take diet pills than limit portions or work out. What we want
is a slick pharmaceutical solution: "One pill makes you small."' 3
As is true of roughly four-fifths of all known drugs, an effective
pharmaceutical remedy for obesity is likely to be derived from a natural source.14
One plausible pharmacological candidate, the cactus Hoodia gordoniis, is prized
for its appetite-suppressing, thirst-quenching, and awareness-heightening
qualities. What the San people of South Africa have known for thousands of
years about the plant they call "Xhoba" languished for three decades in the
laboratories of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). 6 Pfizer
Corporation eventually acquired the rights to a hoodia-derived compound called
P57 (so named because it was the 57th chemical tested) and at one time planned
to market a diet drug that would compete against currently available concoctions
that rely on the troubled combination of ephedra and caffeine. 7 A safe, effective
9. Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 34 (2001). For
an overview of contemporary American food aid policies that is as incisive as it is concise. See generally Vernon
W. Ruttan, Does Food Aid Have a Future?, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 572 (1998).
10. See, e.g., P.I. Boumtje et al., Dietary Habits, Demographics, and the Development of Overweight and
Obesity Among Children in the United States, 30 FOOD POL'Y 115 (2005); Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence
and Trends in Obesity Among U.S. Adults, 288 J.A.M.A. 1723 (2002); Roland Sturm, The Effects of Obesity,
Smoking, and Drinking on Medical Problems and Costs, 21:2 HEALTH AFFAIRS 245 (March/April 2002); Roland
Sturm, Jeanne S. Ringel & Tatiana Andreyeva, Increasing Obesity Rates and Disability Trends, 23:2 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 199 (March/April 2004); cf Michelle M. Mello, Eric B. Rimm & David M. Studdert, The McLawsuit: The
Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22:6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 207 (Nov./Dec. 2003).
11. Cf Alyson C. Floumoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 187 (2000)
(applying a medical analogy to the problem of ecological degradation and restoration).
12. See Peter Barton Hutt, Food and Drug Law: A Strong and Continuing Tradition, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 123 (1982).
13. JEFFERSON AIRPLANE, White Rabbit, on FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS (RCA 1967) ("Go ask
Alice / When she's ten feet tall.").
14. WILSON, supra note 2, at 2.
15. See generally D.B. MacLean & L.G. Luo, Increased ATP Content/Production in the Hypothalamus
May Be a Signal for Energy Sensing of Satiety: Studies of the Anorectic Mechanism of a Plant Steroidal Glycoside,
1020 BRAIN RES. 1 (2004); Orien L. Tulp, et al., Effect of Hoodia Plant on Food Intake and Body Weight in Lean
and Obese LA4Ntul//-cp Rats, 15:4 FASEB J. A404 (March 2001); Orien L. Tulp, Nevin A. Harbi & Ara
DerMarderosian, Effect of Hoodia Plant on Weight Loss in Congenic Obese LA/Ntul//-cp Rats, 16:4 FASEB J.
A648 (March 2002).
16. See generally Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit
Sharing, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 785, 795-96 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the
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substitute, if successfully tested and marketed, would earn massive profits.
"Purchasers of diet products are often 'pathetically eager' to obtain a more
slender figure."' 8 In July 2003, however, Pfizer withdrew from the project and
discontinued clinical development of P57.' 9 The failure to exploit hoodia
commercially mooted the immediate question of whether P57's developers owed
the San people any compensation. As the stories of neem and the rosy periwinkle
illustrate, however, demands for global justice hound almost every effort to
extract agricultural or pharmaceutical value from the biological bounty of the
developing world.
So frequent, so familiar, and so uniform are tales of biological exploitation
that they now follow a predictable script:
<Large northern corporation> <seeks I is developing> a highly
sophisticated <plant variety / pharmaceutical product> and sends
researchers to <exotic place>. After interviewing local <farmers /
foragers>, the company's researchers identify a <species / variety /
breed> of <life form> that seems responsible for <desirable trait>. The
researchers collect a few speciments and collate their interviews. The
samples and the local lore inspire a successful program of <cross-
breeding / genetic engineering / pharmaceutical development>, which
saves the company thousands of hours and enables it to eclipse its
competition. The company never shares its profits, however, with the
local community from which it derived genetic resources and traditional
knowledge. 20
This is the paradigmatic biopiracy narrative. That unmistakably accusatory word
has set the rhetorical baseline in many debates within the international law of
environmental protection and intellectual property for years to come. Many
critics condemn the northern "[c]orporations [that] are surveying remote areas of
the world for medicinal plants, indigenous relatives of common food crops,
exotic sweeteners, sources of naturally occurring pesticides, and even the genetic
material of once-isolated indigenous peoples."'" The epithets "biological
colonialism, '22 "genetic imperialism, '23 and even plain "plunder"24 dominate
many instances of the biopiracy narrative.
Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000 (Jan. 6, 2000); Dietary Supplements
Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,474 (April 3, 2000).
18. United States v. An Article of Food... "Manischewitz ... Diet Thins," 377 F. Supp. 746, 749
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
19. See Press Release, Phytopharm, Pfizer Returns Rights of P57 (last visited Sept. 12. 2005) available at
http://www.phytopharm.co.uk/ press/Rel%2080finalfinal.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
20. See Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 521 (2003)
(inspiring this fill-in-the-blank biopiracy form).
21. BRIAN TOKAR, EARTH FOR SALE, RECLAIMING ECOLOGY IN THE AGE OF CORPORATE GREENWASH 162
(1997).
22. See id.; S.M. Mohamed Idris, Doublespeak and the New Biological Colonialism, 39 THIRD WORLD
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I come not to praise the biopiracy narrative, but to bury it. Most allegations
of biopiracy are so thoroughly riddled with inconsistencies and outright lies that
the entire genre, pending further clarification, must be consigned to the realm of
"rural" legend. Grace has no patent on neem-derived products in India,25 and it is
"not clear that the Grace patent," granted under American law,26 "will have any
[negative] economic or social effect in India., 27 The European Patent Office's
decision to revoke the Grace patent further weakens its impact on India." The
fear that the Grace patent would deprive Indian villagers of the right to continue
traditional uses of neem (including the use of the tree's branches as toothbrushes)
is purely scurrilous. Neem in its natural form is unpatentable.29
As for the rosy periwinkle, Madagascar has an even weaker claim of unjust
treatment.0 The rosy periwinkle is native to Madagascar but grows throughout
the tropics. In 1952, Robert Laing Noble, a member of the medical faculty at the
University of Western Ontario, received 25 rosy periwinkle leaves from his
brother, Clark Noble, who in turn reported that the leaves were used in Jamaica
for diabetes treatment when insulin was unavailable. The leaves had little effect
on blood sugar but strongly inhibited white blood cells. By 1958, Robert Noble's
research team at Western Ontario successfully isolated and purified the potent
alkaloid extract now known as vinblastine. Working independently, Eli Lilly &
Co. found that a crude extract of the whole periwinkle plant prolonged the lives
of mice with leukemia. Eli Lilly eventually synthesized vincristine. Insofar as
Jamaica has a much stronger claim as the source of traditional knowledge that
facilitated the development of vinblastine and vincristine, even advocates of
benefit-sharing find it difficult, if not altogether impossible, to fashion a
convincing case that Eli Lilly should compensate Madagascar.3 1
Despite its implausibility, the biopiracy narrative now dominates legal
RESURGENCE 20 (1993).
23. See TOKAR, supra note 21, at 162-64.
24. See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER: UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (2001).
25. See George K. Foster, Comment, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection:
The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 308 (1998).
26. See James F. Walter, Storage Stable High Azadirachtin Solution, Patent No. 5,281,618 (Jan. 25, 1994).
27. Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification of Life, 22 B.C.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 279, 285 (1999).
28. See Decision Revoking European Patent No. 0436257 (Eur. Patent Off. Feb. 13, 2001).
29. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
30. See Alain Marie, The Rosy Periwinkle: The Little Flower That Saves Lives (June 2003), available at
http://www.symbiosisonline.com/junO3_periwinkle.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
31. See, e.g., A.B. CUNNINGHAM, ETHICS, ETHNOBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH, AND BIODIVERSITY 6 (1993);
DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFiELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD TRADITIONAL
RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES (1996); Karen Anne Goldman,
Compensation for Use of Biological Resources and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of
Conservation Measures and Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 695, 717
(1994).
2006 /There's No Such Thing as Biopiracy ...
scholarship on the commercialization of products whose development can be
traced to a developing country. Advocates for the global south have been
clamoring for proprietary protection against northern, industrial uses of
ethnobiological knowledge, and that demand shows no sign of abating.32 Against
this tide, piecemeal rebuttal of the biopiracy narrative seems futile. In any event,
"[i]t would be a very easy and cheap display of commonplace learning" to pierce
the "glowing and emphatic language" of the biopiracy narrative,33 as conveyed in
individual stories about neem, rosy periwinkle, or hoodia. The time has come, in
short, to dismantle the myth of biopiracy root and branch.
This Article takes a modest first step toward deconstructing the biopiracy
narrative. It will assess claims of biopiracy according to the layered model of
information platforms. Every information platform consists of three distinct
layers-physical, logical, and content-and biological information is no
exception. Layer by layer, I will strip the biopiracy narrative of its plausibility.
The conventional biological distinction between phenotypes and genotypes
separates the physical from the logical layer of information in individual
biological specimens and in species at large. Ethnobiological knowledge is best
characterized as the inventive transformation of genetic information into
commercially valuable applications. An appropriately utilitarian view of property
and its relationship to each layer of biological information thus dissolves any
allegation of biopiracy.
Having drained the biopiracy narrative of its rhetorical power, this Article
will conclude by briefly considering what the proponents of this narrative have
been seeking and how the global community might give the global south what it
needs (if not necessarily what it wants). Most of all, advocates for the global
south seek some way of compensating traditional communities for their
contribution to the global storehouse of biological knowledge. Although that goal
remains out of reach, more modest-and in many ways more beneficial-
intermediate objectives are quite feasible. Simple and salutary reforms of existing
patent law can prevent outsiders from securing intellectual property in knowledge
already developed by traditional communities. To the extent that bioprospecting
will remain part of the global community's portfolio of tools for protecting the
biosphere, countries rich and poor should develop a framework for regulating this
practice and cooperate in encouraging the professionalization of parataxonomy.
32. See Heald, supra note 20, at 522-23.
33. Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287 (1884).
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II. STRIPPING THE BIOPIRACY NARRATIVE OF ITS
POWER, LAYER BY LAYER
A. Biological Diversity as a System of Information
Each alleged episode of biopiracy involves three distinct sources of potential
biological value. First, plant or animal specimens may be valuable as physical
chattels. Second, the chemical and genetic information contained in those
specimens represents a distinct and potentially lucrative source of value. Finally,
local communities are likelier than the world at large, including even trained
scientists, to recognize which native species have medicinally useful properties.
This final bundle of value may be called ethnobiological knowledge. This
interlocking trio corresponds with the biological categories of phenotype,
genotype, and meme. The trio collectively forms a comprehensive information
platform on which enterprising human agents, ranging from village shamans to
multinational pharmaceutical companies, can develop applications of commercial
value in local and global markets. Biopiracy narratives often fail to identify
where episodes of alleged "theft" take place. Attention to the layered nature of
biological information clarifies the extent to which alleged acts of expropriation
warrant legal concern.
Every information platform consists of three layers: a physical layer, a
logical layer, and a content layer.34 Thanks to the relationship between energy
and information,35 "the beneficence of the sun could be regarded as a continuous
gift of 1017 words of information per second to the Earth, rather than as 5 x 107
megawatt hours of power per second., 36 Blessed with "information that has...
flow[ed] for millions of years," nature has compiled "more information of a
higher order of sophistication and complexity... in a few square yards of forest
than there is in all the libraries of mankind. ' 37 The resulting information is
encoded within living organisms. The genetic information from a common
mouse, for instance, could "fill every edition of the Encyclopcedia Britannica
published since 1768." 38 Given the dynamic nature of the biosphere as a network
of living things that continually renegotiate the links between them,39 "[t]he
biosphere that is the planet earth" should be regarded "as an exceedingly
complex 'computer program' with millions of parts, each of which is evolving."
' 4
34. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561,562-63 (2000).
35. See generally Myron Tribus & Edward C. Mclrvine, Energy and Information (Thermodynamics and
Information Theory), SC. AM., Sept. 1971, at 179.
36. J.E. LOVELOCK, GALA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH 150 (1979).
37. GARY SNYDER, TURTLE ISLAND 108 (1974).
38. RICHARD J. TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE: U.S. POLITICS AND THE PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSrrY 10 (1990).
39. See generally RICHARD SOUTHWOOD, THE STORY OF LIFE (2003).
40. John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots Legislation, 52
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Biologist Richard Dawkins eloquently lauds the "illuminating insight" of nature
as megacomputer:
You can, if you wish, think of the genes in all the populations of the
world as constituting a giant computer, calculating costs and benefits and
currency conversions, with the shifting patterns of gene frequencies
doing duty for the shuttling Is and Os of an electronic data processor."
An appropriately high level of abstraction makes it easy to perceive the
layered nature of the biosphere at large as an information platform. The planet's
surface, its waters, and its atmosphere constitute a physical layer, which in turn
provides habitat for all organisms. The biological dynamics that dictate
ecosystem function and stability comprise a logical layer of sorts, much as
languages such as HTML and Java and standards for interconnection such as
TCP/IP enable the Internet to function. The success or failure of efforts to
conserve biodiversity often hinges on the law's treatment of the biosphere's
physical and logical layers. 2 Since their impacts are felt most profoundly at these
"lower" layers, climate change, habitat destruction, and alien invasive species
pose the greatest threats to biological diversity.43
Most casual observers, however, have difficulty understanding the biosphere
as an information platform. Instead, treating nature as an admittedly dynamic
collection of species and specimens is probably the most popular and most easily
understood sense in which the biosphere serves as a storehouse of information."
Even when embodied within smaller units of transmittable biological information
(species, specimens, and genes), however, biological "content" is itself layered.
The biological content represented by a single species can be further divided into
physical, logical, and application-based sub layers. Individual specimens
represent the physical sublayer. The genetic information within these specimens'
DNA constitutes the logical sublayer. Finally, human knowledge regarding
potential applications of genetic information forms a uniquely "soft" form of
biological content. The electronic analogy is complete: just as individual
websites manipulate HTML, Java, TCP/IP, and other elements of the Internet's
logical "code," human ingenuity transforms the biological "code" embedded in
other organisms' DNA into foods, drugs, and other products that serve humans.
HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1168 (2001).
41. RICHARD DAWKINS, CLIMBING MOUNT IMPROBABLE 72 (1996).
42. See generally Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89
IOWA L. REv. 495,530-64 (2004).
43. See generally Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback: Imperfect Legal Responses to
Biodiversity Loss, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 12 (2005); Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback:
Imperfect Legal Responses to Biodiversity Loss, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 197 (Jim Chen ed., 2003).
44. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the Relationship
Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 31 ENVTL. L. RFTR. 10,625, 10,628-29, 10,633 (2001).
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Some layered models of information policy identify not one but two layers
beyond logic: applications and content.5 To avoid confusion with the notion of
species in their own right as a source of biological "content," I shall describe the
corpus of human knowledge about genetic information as the application
sublayer of the biosphere.
Happily, the boundaries between the physical and logical sublayers and
between the logical and application sublayers correspond to two standard
dividing lines in biology: the distinction between phenotypes and genotypes and
the distinction between genes and memes. Careful examination of these
distinctions and of the sublayers they demarcate undermines the normative
premises of the biopiracy narrative.
B. The Physical and Logical Sublayers: Distinguishing Phenotypes from
Genotypes
1. Phenotypes Versus Genotypes, or, Bad Sex Makes Good Eating
The distinction between phenotypes and genotypes separates biological
specimens as physical chattel from biological specimens as sources of genetic
code. In a world shaped by natural and sexual selection, two and only two forces
really matter. One of them is food. The other is sex. 6 The seed is both. "It is both
means of production and, as grain [or fruit], the product."7 The seed itself is a
mere chattel, but the genetic information it contains is conceptually independent.
A genome is at once a set of instructions for assembling and operating an
organism, and a dynamic record of that organism's evolutionary history.48 The
standard legal distinction between chattel and intellectual property, which
corresponds to the distinction between phenotypes and genotypes, explains why
mere possession of the stationery on which a letter is written does not entitle the
possessor to quote or paraphrase the letter itself.49 In economic as well as
biological terms, the phenotypical information contained in a single organism is
quite distinct from that organism's genotype. Whereas consumption of a physical
specimen precludes any other use, genetic information resembles a nonrivalrous
45. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFORMATION INDUSTRIES, THE
INTERNET'S COMING OF AGE 126-29 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REv. 925, 940 (2001); Kevin
Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 57-64 (2002).
46. Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1278 n.99 (1995). See
generally GEOFFREY F. MILLER, THE MATING MIND: How SEXUAL CHOICE SHAPED THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
NATURE 8-9 (2000) (distinguishing between natural and sexual selection as evolutionary forces).
47. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000, at 10 (1988).
48. See generally ANTOINE DANCHIN, THE DELPHIC BOAT: WHAT GENOMES TELL Us (Alison Quayle
transl., 2003).
49. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1987), supplemented, 818 F.2d 252
(2d. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
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public good in that a single use does not preclude independent use by a different
party.5
The Flavr SavrTM tomato, the first transgenically modified organism
approved by the Food and Drug Administration for human consumption,5' vividly
illustrates the distinction between phenotypes and genotypes. Calgene, Inc.,
"introduced into tomatoes" a gene "that produces, as messenger ribonucleic acid
(mRNA), an antisense copy of the polygalacturonase gene," which in turn
"suppresses the production of an enzyme ... that is associated with the
breakdown of pectin, a constituent of the cell wall in tomato fruit. 5 2 The
introduced gene directed the production of complementary RNA that would bind
itself to mRNA that ordinarily governs the production of polygalacturonase (the
enzyme associated with the decomposition of pectin). Tomatoes with lower
levels of polygalacturonase have a longer shelf life because their cell walls
remain intact for a longer period of time.
In plain English, Calgene tricked the tomato into abandoning its original
genetic instructions as a delivery vehicle for seeds and accepting new commands
better suited to shelf life within human kitchens. Natural selection typically does
not yield traits that are useful to humans but inimical to the organism's well-
being. 3 In the tomato's natural state, failure to decompose is lethal to reproductive
success. That same trait, however, enhanced the Flavr Savr's value to humans. As
with hogs and oysters, bad sex makes good eating.
4
50. See Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the
Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 577, 597 (1995).
51. See Calgene, Inc.: Request for Advisory Opinion, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,772 (May 29, 1992); Statement of
Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992). See generally Judith E.
Beach, No "Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 181 (1998).
52. Calgene, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22, 772; see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1370-77
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that Calgene's Flavr Savr tomato did not infringe patents on the use of antisense
technology in Escherichia coli bacteria). The FDA rightly referred to the tomato as a fruit, not vegetable. Love over
gold; biology over law. But the Supreme Court disagrees:
Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans
and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of
provisions, all these are vegetables, which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether
eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage,
celery and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish or meats which
constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893).
53. Tulip mania in seventeenth century Holland provides a partial exception. A virus transmitted by the
peach potato aphid, Myzus persicae, causes the tulip to "break" into multiple colors. This virus "is the only known
instance of a plant disease which greatly increases the value of the infected plant." ANNA PAVORD, THE TULIP: THE
STORY OF A FLOWER THAT HAS MADE MEN MAD 11 (1999); cf Keith Saunders et al., The Earliest Recorded
Plant Virus Disease, 422 NATURE 831 (2003) (reporting that a poem attributed to an eighth century Japanese
empress records the symptoms of a viral disease that turns Eupatorium makinoi a striking yellow in summer).
54. See Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (Patent & Trademark Off. 1987) (recognizing a polyploid oyster
as patentable subject matter, but denying the patent for failure to satisfy the obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103) affid without opinion, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988). "[E]xposing newly fertilized oyster eggs to extreme
water pressure disrupts the normal allocation of chromosomes during cell division, leaving.., oysters with three
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2. National Control over the Physical Layer
Let us return to the basic biopiracy narrative, the better to apply these insights
about phenotypes and genotypes. Suppose that a researcher working for a northern
pharmaceutical company harvests a few specimens of a rare and potentially valuable
plant from its native soil and packs those specimens in her luggage. The act of
harvesting those specimens unquestionably represents a "taking" of that plant within
the meaning of the United States' Endangered Species Act (ESA).5 That statute,
however, appears to have no territorial effect outside the United States. 6 Even if the
Endangered Species Act could be construed so that it overcomes the usual presumption
against extraterritorial application of American law,57 private litigants would face
formidable barriers to enforcing the Act."i Unless the biological hot spot from which
this plant is harvested happens to fall within the jurisdictional reach of the United
States, some other source of law must supply restrictions on takings of that plant.
One pertinent source of law is the Convention on Biological Diversity, an
intemational agreement aimed at promoting "the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources." 9 Article 3 of
the Convention grants states "the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies," subject to "the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment.., beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 6 Through this
simple proclamation, the Convention on Biological Diversity extinguishes any
preexisting claim in international law that genetic resources belong to the
"heritage of mankind" or otherwise lie within a global public domain.6' At the
copies of each chromosome, instead of the normal two .... This makes the oysters sterile and also eliminates their
normal two-month reproductive cycle," which in turn permits the oysters to "be harvested year-round." Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L.
REV. 1051, 1053-54 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
55. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (C) (2000) (declaring it "unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to.. . take [an endangered] species within the United States or the territorial sea of
the United States" or "upon the high seas"); cf id. § 1532(19) ("The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."). Id.
56. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585-89 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
57. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 284-85 (1949); Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
58. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-71.
59. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
1999, art. 1,31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter CBD].
60. Id. art. 3; accord Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
874, 876 (1992) (principle 2).
61. See, e.g., Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the
Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 708-09 (1995) ("Today, source countries reject the
common heritage framework."). See generally KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF
MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 307 (1998) and ACHIM LERCH, VERFUGUNGSRECHTE UND BIOLOGISCHE
VIELFALT 91 (1996) (describing the common heritage principle in international law).
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same time, by recognizing sovereign control over natural resources, the Convention
places the onus for preventing the depletion of a commercially valuable endangered
species squarely on national governments and on domestic environmental law.
The Convention on Biological Diversity, reviled by the United States
government because it allegedly "requir[es] open access to research activities"
and thereby "effectively transfer[s] technology at the expense of' intellectual
property,62 provides an extremely unlikely platform for credible allegations of
biopiracy. International cooperative biodiversity groups-commercial partnerships
involving multinational life sciences companies and national governments in
countries rich in biological diversity-owe their existence to the Convention. 6 The
Convention requires that all contracting parties "[i]dentify components of
biological diversity," take special care in monitoring "those [components]
requiring urgent conservation measures and those which offer the greatest
potential for sustainable use," and identify and monitor "activities which have or
are likely to have significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity." 64 The capacity-building impetus supplied by this
requirement to catalog and monitor biodiversity reinforces the national control
conferred by article 3 of the Convention. Fearful that extinctions will outpace the
research and recovery efforts of poorly trained, equipped, and financed domestic
biologists, nearly all countries welcome foreign bioprospectors. 6 On the other
hand, some source countries have begun to restrict collection by traditional
intermediaries, such as botanical gardens, in an effort to retain local control,
build domestic scientific infrastructure, and capture profits from the value-added
phases of commercial bioprospecting.6
The larger point is that source countries exert complete control over the
physical, phenotypical layer of information in bioprospecting. Subjecting genetic
resources to national sovereignty means, quite simply, that access to those
resources rests entirely under the control of national governments. Accusations
that commercial development is inflicting environmental damage, though
62. Goldman, supra note 31, at 714. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Ratification Resisted:
Understanding America's Response to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989-2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 493 (2002).
63. See, e.g., Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 61, at 725-30; Sarah A. Laird, Contracts for Biodiversity, in
BIODIVERSrrY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 104 (Walter V. Reid
ed., 1993) [hereinafter BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING]; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, II CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 547, 559-60 (2003); Kristen Peterson, Recent Intellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries, 33
HARV. INT'L L.J. 277, 288-89 (1992). The leading example of an international cooperative biodiversity group is
Costa Rica's Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio), established in cooperation with Merck.
64. CBD, supra note 59, art. 7.
65. See Vandana Date, Global "Development" and Its Environmental Ramifications-The Interlinking of
Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intellectual Property Rights, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 631, 636-37
(1997).
66. See Julie M. Feinsilver, Biodiversity Prospecting: Prospects and Realities, in PROSPECTS IN
BIODIvERSrrY PROSPECTING 21, 24 (A.H. Zakri ed., 1995).
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justifiable to some degree,67 should not be laid at the feet of northern
bioprospectors. Local governments, not foreign bioprospectors, hold primary
responsibility for environmental damage attributable to the collection of
biological specimens. Laurie Anne Whitt, for instance, blames pharmaceutical
commercialization for depletion of a rare plant, Pilocarpus jaborandi, used in the
traditional medicine of the Kayapo and Guajajara peoples of Brazil.6 8 If jaborandi
bushes are indeed being overharvested for their pharmacologically active leaves,
the depletion should not be blamed on Merck & Company. Responsibility for this
plant's decline does not rest with the multinational pharmaceutical company
merely because it has developed an anti-glaucoma drug from jaborandi. Rather,
the government of Brazil is accountable for its failure to control access to
jaborandi in its natural range or otherwise to regulate its harvest.69 By the terms
of article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, either Brazil has failed to
exercise properly its "sovereign right to exploit ... resources pursuant to [its]
own environmental policies," or it has shirked "the responsibility to ensure that
activities within [its] jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment." Whatever the merits of Brazil's behavior with respect to
jaborandi, the fact remains that national governments in much of the biodiversity
belt routinely ignore or even oppose biodiversity conservation and the welfare of
indigenous communities.7 ° Few if any developing nations share the United States'
dedication to biodiversity conservation, let alone the United States' resources for
enforcing laws that can be as expensive and politically unpopular as the
Endangered Species Act.
The truth is that national and international laws on biodiversity conservation
have historically imposed very tight limits on harvesting and trafficking in
biological specimens. Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act flatly prohibits
the "tak[ing]" of any protected species. 7' "The term 'take,"' in turn "means to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct., 72 Section 9 so unequivocally condemns
67. Bioprospectors, anthropologists, or joumalists have been known to engage in deliberate misconduct. See
PATRICK TIERNEY, DARKNESS IN EL DORADO: How SCIENTISTS AND JOURNALISTS DEVASTATED THE AMAZON
(2000). Even casual hiking affects the distribution and population of wildlife. See Francesca Ortiz, Candidate
Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary Response to Extinction, 33 GA. L. REV. 413, 508 (1999); cf Mausolf
v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 669-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding snowmobiling restrictions in Voyageurs National Park
on the basis of biological opinions that showed adverse impacts from snowmobiling on gray wolves). See generally
David S. May, Tourism and the Environment, 14 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 57 (1999).
68. See Laurie Ann Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property and the New Imperial Science, 23
OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 211,213-14(1998).
69. See Dennis J. Karjala, Biotech Patents and Indigenous Peoples 5 & n. 12 (unpub. m.s. dated Sept. 17,
2003).
70. See, e.g., Michael Dove, Center, Periphery, and Biodiversity: A Paradox of Governance and a
Developmental Challenge, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 43 (Stephen B. Brush & Dorren Stabinsky eds., 1996); Heald, supra note 20, at 535-36.
71. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000).
72. Id. § 1532(18).
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the harvesting of protected organisms that few if any litigated ESA cases discuss
this aspect of the statute. One of the most prominent reported cases involving an
attempt to harvest a member of a protected species" actually arose under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19727' rather than the ESA.75
At the international level, traffic in goods derived from endangered species
remains the single act of biodiversity destruction on which the global community
has reached a punitive consensus. The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES),76 now in its fourth decade, would represent a major
step toward conserving biodiversity, as long as one is willing to overlook the fact
that it does not work. During the 1980s, the extension of CITES to "all aspects of
trade and research" in orchids "immediately increased the desire for the plants,
raised their market value dramatically, and led to even more collecting of rare
orchid species from the wild. 77 Yet the treaty raised no legal barriers to
developers and farmers who would "flood [critical] habitat with a hydroelectric
dam, log it, level the hillsides of a road, build a golf course on the site, or burn
the jungle to the ground for agricultural purposes. 78 Not surprisingly, "no
reliable data [show] that CITES and similar efforts halve] reduced smuggling,
saved any orchid species from extinction, helped protect orchid habitats, or even
salvaged orchid plants facing ... certain destruction., 79 That controlled harvests
for profit should outperform direct regulation in taming the ivory trade and
deterring the poaching of elephants80 provides a singularly powerful rebuke of
CITES.
In short, responsibility for alleged biopiracy in the physical sublayer falls
squarely on the national government asserting sovereignty over commercially
valuable species in their natural habitat. Under the Convention on Biological
Diversity, individual components of the biosphere do not constitute a shared
"heritage of mankind." They fall under the sovereign control of individual
nations, which can blame only themselves for any failure to soften the
environmental impact of seeking and harvesting biological specimens.
73. See United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (2000).
75. Cf United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding ESA penalties levied against
a rancher who shot and decapitated a gray wolf), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072 (1999).
76. 27 U.S.T. 1087 (1973), entered into force July 1, 1975.
77. ERIc HANSEN, ORCHID FEVER: A HORTICULTURAL TALE OF LOVE, LUST, AND LUNACY 67 (2000).
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id. at 262-63.
80. See EDWARD BARBtER ET AL., ELEPHANTS, ECONOMICS AND IVORY 132-38 (1990); FRANCES
CAIRNCROSS, COSTING THE EARTH: THE CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNMENTS, THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BUSINESS
132-41 (1992); Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990).
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3. National Variation in the Patentability of Genetic Information
Within the logical sublayer, genetic information emphatically does lend itself
to ownership as intellectual property. To be sure, patent law denies protection to
scientific principles deemed to be laws of nature.' This doctrine likewise blocks
the patenting of a naturally occurring organism. The United States historically
denied patent protection to all naturally occurring substances, even those that had
been isolated and purified by human agency. 2 The Supreme Court reversed
course radically in 1980 with Diamond v. Chakrabarty,83 the celebrated case that
upheld a patent on a Pseudomonas bacterium that had been genetically altered to
degrade several components of crude oil. Today we no longer ask whether life
forms can be patented, but merely how far those rights can and should extend.
Plant breeders in the United States can secure patents,84 plant patents,85 plant
variety certificates, 6 and insofar as genetic engineering involves the manipulation
of biological information at the molecular level-perhaps even copyrights.87 The
trade secret laws of the states provide additional protection for certain hybrid
crops.88 Since 1988 the Patent Office has routinely granted utility patents for
transgenic animals. 9
81. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see also Parke-Davis & Co.
v. H.K. Mulford, 189 F. 95, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.) (denying patentability to "products of nature" and to
mere "discoveries" of scientific principles); cf Convention on the Grant of European Patents, adopted at Munich,
Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52(2)(a), 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter European Patent Convention] (excluding
"discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods" from the definition of "inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step").
82. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 366-84 (2002).
83. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
84. See Patent Act of 1952, § 1, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593 (2001); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443
(1985); cf In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding that a compound purified from strawberries can be
patented even though a nonpurified form of that compound exists in strawberries).
85. See Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000); Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. Califomia-Florida
Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui,
433 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
86. See Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (2000); Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See
generally Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in Furtherance of
Innovation Policy, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. (forthcoming 2005).
87. See Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469 (1989);
Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191 (1982); Doreen M.
Hogle, Comment, Copyright for Innovative Biotechnological Research: An Attractive Alternative to Patent or
Trade Secret Protection, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 75 (1990); Donna Smith, Comment, Copyright Protection for the
Intellectual Property Rights to Recombinant Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1093 (1988).
But see IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 11.02 (1985) (disputing the copyrightability of DNA
sequences); UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PATENTING LIFE 43 (1989)
(noting the Copyright Office's unofficial position that nucleic acid sequences are not copyrightable).
88. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Holden's Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
89. See, e.g., Philip Leder & Timothy A. Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No.
4,736,866 (issued April 12, 1988); see also Policy on Patenting of Animals, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Off. 24 (1987)
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At the international level, national decisions to recognize private ownership
of genetic code is governed by the World Trade Organization's Annex on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).90 TRIPS requires WTO
members to award "patents... for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step, and are capable of industrial application."9' The agreement,
however, does permit its members to forgo patents on "plants and animals other
than micro-organisms" or "essentially biological processes for the production of
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes." 92 As
a result, the eligibility of genetic information for patent protection varies
considerably across national boundaries.
Although the United States has enthusiastically embraced intellectual
property on genetic information, other countries have adopted more restrictive
policies. India, to name perhaps the most restrictive example, has chosen not to
grant biotechnology patents.93 Even within the North Atlantic alliance, the United
States is strikingly liberal on the issue of biotechnology patents. Harvard
University's celebrated "Oncomouse" patent94 (covering a mouse transgenically
altered to be especially prone to cancer) has highlighted differences between the
patent laws of the United States and those of its closest allies. The Supreme
Court of Canada surprisingly refused in 2002 to uphold a patent on Harvard's
Oncomouse. 95 The Canadian decision was all the more striking because it rested
solely on the Canadian Patent Act, whose definition of patentable subject matter
(outlining procedures for animal patents); Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life,
28 JURIMETRICS J. 399 (1988); Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms, supra note 54; Thomas Traian
Moga, Transgenic Animals as Intellectual Property (Or the Patented Mouse That Roared), 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 511 (1994); Kevin W. O'Connor, Patenting Animals and Other Living Things, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 597 (1991); Paul Blunt, Note, Selective Breeding and the Patenting of Living Organisms, 48
SYRACUSEL. REV. 1365 (1998).
90. See Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round, World Trade
Organization, done at Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1981 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995)
[hereinafter TRIPS]; see also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, done at Marrakesh, April 15, 1994, 3, 33 I.L.M. 1143, 1143 (1994).
91. TRIPS, supra note 90, art. 27(1); see also id. art. 1(1) ("Members shall give effect to the provisions of
this Agreement."). TRIPS expressly permits a member to deem "the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of
industrial application' ... to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively." Id. art. 27(1)
n.5. Utility and nonobviousness, of course, are the basic requirements for patentability in American law. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2000).
92. TRIPS, supra note 90, art. 27(3)(b).
93. Foster, supra note 25, at 308.
94. See Philip Leder & Timothy A. Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866
(issued April 12, 1988). See generally THE LABORATORY MOUSE (Hans Hedrich ed., 2004).
95. See Harvard College v. Canada, 2002 SCC 76.
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is almost identical with that of the United States' Patent Act.96
Controversy over the Oncomouse also inspired the European Union to adopt a
Biotechnology Directive that purported to clarify key provisions of the European
Patent Convention. 97 In addition to barring patents on "inventions the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality,""s the European
Patent Convention denies patents for "plant or animal varieties or essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals." 99 On the other hand,
"microbiological processes or the products thereof' may be patented.'°
The European Biotechnology Directive, handed down in July 1998, permits
patents on "biological material," more precisely defined as "any material containing
genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a
biological system."'' To be eligible for a patent, such biological material must be
"isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical
process... even if it previously occurred in nature."'' 0 2 Plants and animals may be
patented under European law, but only "if the technical feasibility of the invention is
not confined to a particular plant or animal variety."' 10 3 The European "system of
Community plant variety rights" thus provides "the sole and exclusive property right
for plant varieties" under the law of the European Union.''4 Because the European
Patent Convention's bar on patents for "plant... varieties" applies to all "plant
varieties irrespective of the way in which they were produced," no European patent
may be granted for "plant varieties containing genes introduced into an ancestral
plant by recombinant gene technology."'0 5 Though framed as a hard-fought
compromise between opponents of biotechnological patents and business interests
fearing the flight of biotechnological talent and innovative capital from Europe,' °6 the
96. Compare Patent Act, R.S.C. ch. P-4, § 2 (1985) (authorizing patents for "any new and useful art,
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter") with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (authorizing patents for "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof').
See generally Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003) (praising the Canadian Oncomouse decision for vesting choices over patentable
subject matter with "the correct institutional actor: the legislature").
97. See Council Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.. (L
213) 13 [hereinafter European Biotechnology Directive].
98. European Patent Convention, supra note 81, art. 53(a).
99. Id. art. 53(b).
100. Id.
101. European Biotechnology Directive, supra note 97, art. 2.1 (a).
102. Id. art. 3.2.
103. Id. art. 4.2 (emphasis added).
104. See Community Plant Variety Rights, Council Reg. (EC) No. 2100/94, 1994 O.J. (L 227) 1, art. 1
[hereinafter European Plant Variety Regulation].
105. European Patent Office, Enlarged Bd. of Appeal, Transgenic plant/NOVARTIS II, G 0001/98 EBA 38
(Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/g980001exl.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
106. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM 0. HENNESSEY & SHIRA PERLMUTTER, INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 432 (2002).
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Biotechnology Directive has sparked fierce debate within the European Union. °7
France and the Netherlands, in particular, prefer a more restrictive approach to
biotechnology patents.'°8
Within the international legal framework governing intellectual property,
individual nations enjoy considerable freedom to grant or deny patent protection
to genetic information. Though characterized as bundles of intangible rights,
patents remain a peculiarly terrestrial form of property. They are valid only in the
country that issues them. There simply is no legal support for contrary assertions,
such as the rural legend that an American patent on azadirachtin (the pesticide
that W.R. Grace derived from neem) would forbid traditional uses of neem in
India. Although TRIPS does require its members to "provide for the protection of
plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system, ' ' that
accord obliges no country to grant animal patents. Canada and the European
Union therefore remain free to adopt strikingly different policies, vis-a-vis the
United States, on the Harvard oncomouse and a wide range of other
biotechnological inventions.
The existence of legal diversity across national boundaries goes a long way
toward negating the assertion that the availability of patents on genetic
information per se represents biopiracy. National governments exert almost as
much control over biotechology patents under TRIPS as they do over the
collection of biological specimens under the Convention on Biological Diversity.
In all events, each nation's patents lose legal vigor upon crossing international
boundaries. The window of opportunity for unfair exploitation of genetic
material traceable to developing countries is narrow indeed.
C. From Genes to Memes: The Application Sublayer and the Legal Status of
Ethnobiological Knowledge
1. Genes Versus Memes
Organisms exhibit starkly divergent economic characteristics when serving
as chattels and as carriers of chemical or genetic information. A harvested
organism can provide useful information either as a chemical blueprint or as a
107. See Bagley, supra note 96; Jasmine C. Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in
the United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy Is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
223, 225 (2002); Lydia Nenow, Comment, To Patent or not to Patent, The European Union's New Biotech
Directive, 23 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 569, 573 (2001).
108. See Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament & Council, Case 377/98, OJ. C 331
(European Ct. Justice 2001); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in
the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1657 (2000).
109. TRIPS, supra note 90, art. 27(3)(b); cf Johanna Sutherland, TRIPS, Cultural Politics, and Law
Reform, 16 PROMETHEUS 291, 295 (1998) (observing that WTO negotiations over TRIPS left no records
addressing the characteristics of an "effective" sui generis system).
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source of genes and traits for further manipulation through conventional breeding
or transgenic engineering."° Proteins and genes, in other words, are nonrivalrous,
nonexclusive goods."' Unlike chattels, these types of information are public
goods in the sense that a single use does not preclude independent use by a
different party." '2 Like "public goods, such as national defense," intellectual
goods "often do not encompass natural physical barriers that exclude potential
consumers," "may be held by more than one person at a time," can be distributed
at "minimal or nonexistent" cost, and once disclosed face "no real barriers to free
appropriation. '"' In stark contrast with the rivalrous nature of most property,
whereby "possession by one party results in a gain that precisely corresponds to
the loss endured by... [an]other party," use of a nonrivalrous good "by one
entity does not diminish the use and enjoyment of others."
'" 4
Examining the boundary between phenotype and genotype thus gives us a
glimpse at the central dynamic of the biopiracy narrative. A single sample of a
rare rainforest plant can be transformed by a northern life sciences company into
a lucrative drug or plant variety, and the physical means ordinarily used to
confine chattels can scarcely stem the outward flow of information and wealth.
Worse still, what is true of a plant specimen is also true of tribal lore. The
valuable "package" at issue in many instances of alleged biopiracy actually
consists of two distinct components: the chemical and genetic information
encoded in a biological specimen, plus ethnobiological knowledge of the traits
and traditional uses of that species. Claims of biopiracy often stress the
sociological component to the exclusion of the biological, or else treat the two
components as if they were inseparable."5 But genetic information is readily
distinguished from communal knowledge of plants and animals.
A sociologically oriented strain in contemporary biology, pioneered by
Richard Dawkins, distinguishes sharply between genes and memes. A "meme" is
"a unit of cultural transmission," such as "tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes
fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches." '1 6 The sociological
110. See Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35 J.L. &
ECON. 199, 201 (1992).
111. See Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the
Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 597 (1995).
112. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 (1989).
113. Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 560, 584-85 (1993).
114. Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1369 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
115. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. HANSEN ET AL., TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A
HANDBOOK ON ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS IN PROTECTING THEIR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 5 (2003); Winona LaDuke, Traditional
Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 127 (1994); Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and
Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919 (1996).
116. RJCHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192 (new ed. 1989).
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equivalent of a gene, the meme as "a new kind of replicator ... is [already]
achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene panting far
behind."" 7 Every ethnobiological tale is a meme, easily severed from the
chemical and genetic information that inspired it. Even legal concepts are
memes." 8 As I have just demonstrated, the gene may qualify for protection as a
form of intellectual property. The meme deserves separate economic and legal
consideration.
2. Protecting Ethnobiological Knowledge as Trade Secrets
Article 80) of the Convention on Biological Diversity exhorts its contracting
parties to "respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.""' 9 The Convention also
"encourage[s] the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such
knowledge, innovations and practices."'2° Although these exhortations are binding
only insofar as the actions at issue are "possible," "appropriate," and properly
"[s]ubject to [the] national legislation" of a contracting party,' the Convention
remains "the only international treaty that specifically acknowledges the role of
traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices in biodiversity conservation and
sustainable development" and explicitly admonishes individual countries to provide
some form of protection for traditional knowledge, "whether through intellectual
,,122property or other means.
Existing laws on intellectual property, at both the national and the international
level, can be modified so that they traditional as well as "scientific" knowledge.
2
1
The ability to change intellectual property laws should come as no surprise.
Intellectual property in any form is a creature of positive law, consciously crafted to
achieve one regulatory goal or another.
24
Quite arguably, a workable model for protecting ethnobiological knowledge
117. Id.; cf EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 136 (1998) (proposing the
unification of the meme concept with "node[s] of semantic memory" recognized in neuroscience).
118. See Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J.
291 (1999).
119. CBD, supra note 59, art. 8(j).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233,
260-61 (2001).
123. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCE BOOK (Tom
Greaves ed., 1994); GRAHAM DUTFIELD, CAN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT PROTECT BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL
DIVERSITY? (1997); DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD
TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES (1996); David R. Downes,
How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253 (2000);
Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in Resolving Protection of the
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633,670 (2003).
124. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1240 (1998).
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already exists, for many forms of traditional may satisfy certain elements of the
definition of trade secrets.'25 A fairly modest conceptual extension of conventional
definitions of trade secrets easily embraces ethnobiological knowledge. The
Restatement of Torts' formulation has won the Supreme Court's endorsement on
multiple occasions:
[A] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a
process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a
machine or other device, or a list of customers.'
26
Similarly, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act protects "a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process" as long as the
information in question not only "derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from no being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use," but also "is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy."'
27
More recently, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has simplified
these definitions into a single, brief sentence: "A trade secret is any information
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others.' 28 A scheme to protect traditional knowledge might begin
by excising the words "and secret" from this definition. To be eligible for
proprietary protection, traditional knowledge must contain some "information
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable.. . to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others."
The requirement of secrecy under trade secret law need not meet the test of
"novelty" under patent law. 29 Even where no patent could issue, trade secret
protection may be available. 3° Recognition of a trade secret does not depend
upon an "inventive step," a requirement of patent law that traditional knowledge
rarely if ever satisfies.13' When the recipient of knowledge enjoys a licensing
125. See Gelvina Rodriguez Stevenson, Note, Trade Secrets: The Secret to Protecting Indigenous
Ethnobiological (Medicinal) Knowledge, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POE. 1119 (2000).
126. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); accord, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1002 (1984); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,474-75 (1974).
127. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990).
128. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995); accord, e.g., Reingold v. Swiftships,
Inc., 126 F.3d 645,650,652 (5th Cir. 1997).
129. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 1968).
130. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979).
131. Cf Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual
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arrangement or some other business relationship with its originator, the law of
trade secrets readily imposes a duty to respect its confidentiality.'32 "The
protections of ... trade secret law are most effective at the developmental stage,
before a product has been marketed and the threat of reverse engineering
becomes real."'33 "A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against
discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental
disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development or manufacture. '' 3
3. The Case Against Protecting Ethnobiological Knowledge
Simply because ethnobiological knowledge can be protected through some
form of intellectual property, however, does not mean that it should be so
protected. The ultimate question is whether ethnobiological knowledge deserves
proprietary protection. The harsh reality is that there is no economically
justifiable reason for protecting ethnobiological knowledge as property.
Ethnobiological knowledge already lies in a public domain of sorts, albeit
perhaps a very small public consisting of the members of an indigenous tribe
whose culture itself is endangered. 35 Biopiracy, by spreading knowledge of an
organism's useful properties, is "locally objectionable but globally beneficial."'
3 6
Once ideas enter a global public domain, they should stay. Thomas Jefferson, the
first administrator of patents in the United States, observed: "He who receives an
idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
137
The intellectual property laws of the United States forbid measures that
purport to remove ideas from the public domain and to reassign them to a private
owner. "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available.' 3 s A contrary approach effectively assumes "that the
public interest in free access to" cultural information "is entirely worthless and
that authors [and inventors], as a class, should receive a windfall solely based on
Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 277 (1998) (arguing that folk knowledge rarely
exhibits the sort of inventive step that patent law demands).
132. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 & n.4 (1974); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969).
133. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989).
134. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476.
135. Cf CBD, supra note 59, art. 8(j) (exhorting all contracting parties, as part of their obligation to
conserve biodiversity in situ, to "respect... indigenous knowledge" and to "encourage... equitable sharing" of the
benefits derived from biological resources).
136. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 14 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 52 (2000).
137. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1965) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
138. Id. at 6.
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completed creative activity."'39 As the Supreme Court recognized twelve decades
ago:
It was never the object of [the patent] laws to grant a monopoly for every
trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would
naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in
the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate creation of
exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention.
It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their business to
watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the
form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon
the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real
advancement of the art. 140
Protecting indigenous knowledge as intellectual property would likewise stifle
the free exchange of ideas that gave rise to this information in the first place.'
4 1
Moreover, trade secret law, the mode of intellectual property most often
invoked to extend proprietary protection to ethnobiological knowledge, provides
an exceptionally poor vehicle for delivering information of any sort into the
public domain. Trade secret law, by design, keeps information concealed. By
contrast, patent and copyright laws are designed to deliver privately held
information into public hands. Proprietary protection of ideas should be designed
to spur "release to the public of the products of... creative genius"; incidental
"reward to the owner [is] a secondary consideration."'' 42 Introducing an idea to the
global community in the broadest sense is the very purpose of intellectual
property. 43 "[I1n respect to works already created," however, any grant of
intellectual property "creates no economic incentive at all."'44 Indeed, protecting
existing work constitutes an economically destructive, preemptive strike against
future innovation.'
4 5
139. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 192, 200 (1883); accord Slawson v. Grand Street, P.P. &
F.R. Co., 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 649, 654 (1883); Phillips v. City of Detroit, 111 U.S. 604, 608 (1884); Thompson v.
Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 12 (1885); Railroad Supply Co v. Elyria Iron & Steel Co., 244 U.S. 285, 293 (1917); Great
Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
141. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in
International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 59, 78 (1998); Gary P. Nabhan, Sharing the Benefits of Plant Resources and Indigenous
Scientific Knowledge, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 186, 192 (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996).
142. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); accord, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201,219 (1954).
143. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the
primary objective in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labor of
authors.").
144. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 257 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
145. See Dennis S. Kaijala, The Term of Copyright, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR
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Intellectual property rights are not and should not be "given as favors."'46
They "are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right,
limited to a term of years .... to exclude others from the use of his [or her]
invention.' ' 7 A patent "is a privilege which is conditioned by a public purpose":
a spur to innovation and a product of realized invention, a patent "is limited to
the invention which it defines."' 48 The "economic philosophy behind" both
"patents and copyrights" is "the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."", 149 This
constitutional mandate commits American intellectual property law to a strictly
utilitarian mission, one in which advancing knowledge and generating useful
innovations take precedence over abstract concepts such as personal autonomy
and self-expression.'50 Just as the fourteenth amendment did not "enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"' 5 ' the patent and copyright clause of the
Constitution did not endorse the property-rights philosophy of John Locke,
Immanuel Kant, or Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 2
As the legacy of humanity, ethnobiological knowledge belongs in a global
commons. The principal "economic rationale" justifying the privatization of land
and other tangible objects-namely, rivalry among competing users of a finite,
exhaustible resource-"simply does not apply to" traditional knowledge or any
other kind of "information good[] ., 15' A utilitarian attitude toward intellectual
property dictates a very simple answer: "From an economic perspective, the more
people who can use information, the better."' Ideas are as "free as the air to
common use."' 5 Rejecting the rhetoric of biopiracy helps keep ideas in the public
domain.
LIBRARIES, EDUCATION, AND SoCIETY 33, 42-44 (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997).
146. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,229 (1964).
147. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,666 (1944)..; cf Twentieth Cent. Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (describing copyright as designed "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good").
148. Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 666.
149. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
150. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 59 (2001); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New
Economy, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 453,461 (2001).
151. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. For explanations of the impact of these philosphers on European intellectual property law, see
generally Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1997); Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
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III. THERE'S No SUCH THING AS BIOPIRACY... AND
IT'S A GOOD THING Too
Stripped of its normative premises layer by layer, the biopiracy narrative
loses all appeal. The Convention on Biological Diversity's endorsement of
national sovereignty assigns national governments all responsibility for initial
access to genetic resources. Access to physical biological specimens is the one
aspect of bioprospecting that lies entirely within the control of individual nation-
states. Few, if any, national governments have elected to throttle this economic
chokepoint for fear of destroying all prospective profits from the commercial
development of biological diversity. Within the logical sublayer, the TRIPS
accord allows the principal jurisdictions of the North Atlantic alliance-the
United States, Canada, and the European Union-to adopt radically diverse
solutions to the problem of patenting genetic information. Developing countries
such as India, which are the usual complaining parties in instances of alleged
biopiracy, enjoy ample discretion under TRIPS to refuse patents on a wide range
of biotechnological inventions. Finally, although traditional knowledge is
susceptible to protection through a modified form of trade secret law, no
convincing economic case for such protection can be made.
Within the biopiracy debate, no country strikes a consistent posture toward
intellectual property as a legal tool. The southern countries that urge recognition
of intellectual property in indigenous knowledge are often proponents of
weakening proprietary protection on pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, and
educational materials in the name of increased access. 56 A study by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) found that respondents in 28 less
developed countries, despite their misgivings about intellectual property as a
legal concept and about aspects of specific intellectual property laws, often
"expressed interest in exploring further the actual and potential role" of
intellectual property in protecting traditional knowledge. 15 7 Subsequent WIPO
publications have committed the organization to the project of developing models
for protecting genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore at the
international level. "8 North and south, the local attitude toward intellectual
156. See Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round • Negotiating Strategies of the
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1383 (1990); Muria Kruger, Note, Hannonizing
TRIPs and the CBD: A Proposal from India, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 169, 170 (2001).
157. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS, 1998-99, at 223 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
158. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., MATTERS CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (Apr.-May 2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2001igc/pdf/grtkfucl_3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., MATTERS CONCERNING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE
(Aug. 15, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo-gb-ga/pdf/wo-ga.30_5.
pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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property depends on what is being protected and what degree of protection
delivers the greatest benefit to local interests. Global cries for justice demand
more ethical starch than this. "[If you go chasing rabbits /.. you know you're
going to fall."'5 9
There's no such thing as biopiracy, and it's a good thing too. The real point
of the biopiracy narrative is that the global south wants its largest possible share
of the world's wealth. As matters stand, it is quite simple: The north is rich, and
the south is not. Developing countries will not soon cease clamoring for some
compensatory mechanism, whether or not grounded in the law of intellectual
property, that would reward their historical contributions to biological knowledge
and applications within the global commons. Motivated by "post-colonial
theories of obligation to peoples in areas long exploited by the northern
hemisphere," much of the international community seeks some way to alleviate
"the extreme distress of those living in bio-rich areas of the world." '60 Thanks to
the "deep antagonism" generated by even the mere perception of illicit
"appropriation of knowledge and germ plasm without... permission" and
without compensation, the life sciences companies of the north will continue to
make a big target for the developing world's political grievances. 16' The southern
quest, so it seems, will stop at nothing short of a formal requirement under
international law "that inventors compensate traditional knowledge holders for
sharing that knowledge.' 62
The rhetorical consequences of this attack can be quite grim for the
developing world. Most obviously, bioprospecting could come to a complete
halt. Given the relatively modest profits realized from the first decades of
bioprospecting, a comprehensively "instrumental or economic rationale" for
protecting the biosphere as a storehouse of commercial value "appears beyond
reach.', 163 Paul Heald cogently recognizes, even if the most ardent proponents of
the biopiracy narrative do not, that the repeated hurling of "biopiracy!" as a
misleading epithets will hardly convince profit-driven multinational corporations
to engage the developing world.
Moreover, an emphasis on the traditional knowledge of developing countries
invites the immediate application of the developed world's standards of
environmental protection and performance to vastly poorer countries. Much of
the developing world already regards the environmental imperatives of the
developed world as imperialism in green drag.' 64 The southern campaign to
159. Hear JEFFERSON AIRPLANE, supra note 13.
160. Heald, supra note 20, at 521.
161. Id.
162. Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small
World, 87 MNN. L. REv. 679, 725 n. 180 (2003).
163. Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act,
38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 844 (1997). For an older but still instructive survey of utilitarian rationales in
environmental law, see Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393 (1981).
164. See Raj Bhala, MRS. WATU and International Trade Sanctions, 33 INT'L LAW. 1, 21 (1999); Bartram
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enhance the proprietary status of its germplasm and its ethnobiological
knowledge will engage not only the law of property, but also the entire legal
apparatus of the industrialized world. Many traditional practices may
affirmatively harm the environment, or at least conflict with global values
expressed through international environmental law. Asian folk medicine drives
global demand for rhinoceros horns and black bear claws. 165 On opposite sides of
the Pacific, Japanese appetites66 and Makah rituals 67 clash with the International
Convention on Whaling. 68  Consumers in Florida who prize the eggs of
endangered sea turtles as aphrodisiacs pay $36 per dozen. 169
The uncomfortable truth is that the developing world enjoys no moral
superiority vis-it-vis wealthier countries on matters of environmental ethics.
"Small-scale communities are seldom as humane and ecologically sound" as their
advocates "portray them to be."'"" "Small firms ... are responsible for a
massively disproportionate share of water and air pollution."'7 ' Agriculture is
especially suspect. "One would be hard pressed to identify another industry with
as poor an environmental record and as light a regulatory burden."' 72 Smaller,
family-owned farms routinely underperform their larger, corporate counterparts
in core tasks such as soil conservation and erosion control. 173 The propensity to
destroy the environment flourishes in any cultural setting.
Any environmental advantage along the developmental divide favors
countries whose legal systems have adopted the most comprehensive and
coherent rules for managing their citizens' contact with the living world in an age
of growing scarcity and declining diversity. In industrialized societies, the law
S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 376-77 (1994).
165. See, e.g., William Carroll Muffett, Regulating the Trade in Bear Parts for Use in Asian Traditional
Medicine, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
166. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (interpreting the
International Whaling Convention); Kazuo Sumi, The "Whale War" Between Japan and the United States:
Problems and Prospects, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 317 (1989).
167. See United States v. Washington, 730 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); North Pacific Eastern Stock of Gray
Whales, 48 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 28 (1997) (applying the whaling convention's exemption for
"traditional uses of whale product by local aboriginal, indigenous or native communities in meeting their
nutritional, subsistence and cultural requirements").
168. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of Whaling Regulations,
adopted Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 (1948).
169. See Dana Canedy, Eggs of Endangered Turtles Fall Prey to Florida Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2002, at Al.
170. MARTIN W. LEwIS, GREEN DELUSIONS: AN ENVIRONMENTALIST CRITIQUE OF RADICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM 91 (1992).
171. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small
Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 559 (1998).
172. J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 269
(2000); J.B. Ruh], The Environmental Law of Farms: 30 Years of Making a Mole Hill Out of a Mountain, 31
ENvTL. L. REP. 10,203 (2001); see also Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from
Economic Objectives in Agricultural Regulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333 (1995).
173. See Linda K. Lee, The Impact of Landownership Factors on Soil Conservation, 62 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1070, 1073 (1980); Luther Tweeten, The Economics of Small Farms, 219 SCIENCE 1037, 1038 (1983).
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has comfortably assimilated the achievements of life scientists and shaped their
attitudes. Nations such as the United States routinely confer patents, plant variety
certificates, and other intellectual property rights for biological innovations. With
equal vigor, however, western nations also subject those scientists to rigorous
regulatory schemes in order to preserve the environment and to prevent ethical
abuses. 174 It remains unclear whether traditional knowledge will ever qualify for
proprietary protection in the world's wealthiest countries. Those practices having
taken center stage in an international legal dialogue dominated by accusations of
biopiracy, it hardly stretches the imagination to contemplate ways in which
wealthier countries may test the developing world's commitment to the complete
integration of their traditions into the positive law of the global community.
What the global south and its advocates really seek in the struggle over
biopiracy is a simple measure of justice. Massive wealth transfers are what they
seek later; modest obstacles to patents on biotechnology may appease these
advocates while the global community progresses, albeit at a snail's pace, toward
some sort of profit-sharing scheme for spreading the rewards of the
biotechnological revolution. Resolving disputes over alleged biopiracy does not
require significant revision of existing intellectual property laws, let alone the
novel and economically senseless solution of proprietary status for traditional
knowledge of biological properties and applications. It may be enough simply to
ensure that alleged acts of biopiracy do not form the basis for patents under
existing intellectual property laws.
Cleansing the current patent system of the taint of biopiracy requires little
more than a few modifications that would effectively deny intellectual property
rights to outsiders who export and exploit knowledge originally developed within
a traditional community. American patent law in particular could withstand a
modest degree of legislative revision. As the Patent Act of 1935 now reads, "[a]
patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.' 75 Prior art, if
found, has a devastating effect on a patent. Prior art that defeats section 102's
novelty requirement can also be used to crush a patent for failure to overcome
section 103's hurdle of nonobviousness. 1
76
The trouble lies in the definition of prior art. The Patent Act's definition of
prior art embraces patenting or publication in any country, but includes public
174. See, e.g., Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-224, 114 Stat. 358 (2000); Animal
Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (2000); Plant Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-224, § 412, 114 Stat. 358, 441
(2000).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (2000).
176. See Oddz on Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1401-04 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Bass, 474
F.2d 1276, 1290 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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use or sale solely "in this country.' 77 To be exact:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... the invention was known
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by
the applicant for patent, or ... the invention was patented or described in
a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States.'
In other words, "while almost all domestic prior knowledge, use, or invention is
considered against a later United States patent, almost all similar foreign activity
is not.',
179
The United States' policy of limiting prior art to domestic knowledge is out
of step with patent law in other developed countries. The European Union
considers evidence of foreign public use in assessing the validity of its patents.'80
Indeed, on the basis of foreign public use-specifically, widespread applications
of the neem tree in India-the European Patent Office revoked W.R. Grace's
patent on "Neemix," a pesticide and insect repellant derived from azadirachtin, a
chemical naturally occurring in neem.'' Redefining "prior art" to include
traditional knowledge found in other countries would limit the complicity of
American patent law in instances of alleged biopiracy. 2 Even under the existing
definition of prior art, the Patent and Trademark Office revoked a patent on
turmeric after prior art on medicinal uses of the spice was demonstrated through
an ancient Sanskrit text and a scientific paper published in 1953 by the Indian
Medical Association.'"3 Eliminating American patent law's existing geographical
limitation on prior art would, however, still allow "inventions based on
177. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2000). See generally Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 190 Ct. Cl.
858 (1970); Donald S. Chisum, Foreign Activity: Its Effects on Patentability Under United States Law, II INT'L
REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 26 (1980).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b).
179. Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent
Controversy, 37 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 371, 376 (1997); accord Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International
Conflict over the Commodification of life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 284 (1999); see also Bagley, supra
note 162 at 695-96; Stevenson, supra note 125, at 1146-48. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual
Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 520 (1997) (discussing the territoriality of
American patent law.
180. See European Patent Convention, supra note 81, art 54(2) ("The state of the art shall be held to
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183. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1056 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long
eds., 1997).
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traditional knowledge and genetic resources" to be "patentable as long as they are
novel and nonobvious in view of [that] prior art. '"
At the international level, TRIPS does not require that patent applications
state the origin of genetic materials or biological knowledge used to invent a
product. Although TRIPS directs members to "require that an applicant for a
patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for
the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art,"'85 the treaty imposes
no further disclosure obligations or other mandatory conditions on patent
applicants. More comprehensive protection for traditional knowledge lies entirely
beyond the scope of TRIPS, and even the most ardent advocates lament that a
legal framework for protecting traditional knowledge is "highly unlikely" to "be
inserted into TRIPS anytime soon."'
8 6
What, in the meanwhile, might gainfully warrant the attention of countries
both rich and poor? No matter how unprofitable, and no matter how modest in its
impact on biodiversity conservation, commercial bioprospecting will persist for
years to come. International policymakers should develop a joint framework for
its regulation. International coordination on commercial exploitation of
biodiversity can improve the very process of collecting rare specimens. Even
though the collapse of global fisheries has shaken public confidence in official
efforts to achieve "sustainability,"'87 bitter experience teaches that the lack of
coordination would be worse. The slash-and-collect approach of Victorian orchid
harvesters would probably prevail." Rationalized harvesting would limit
instances of "the wonderfully unusual accomplishment of discovering and
eradicating in the same instant a new species."'8 9
The international community might also facilitate the professionalization of
parataxonomy,'19 especially in the developing world. Millions of species await
collection and classification by properly trained field biologists. Transnational
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cooperation can help translate ethnobiological knowledge into terms understood by
the global scientific community. Its economic impact is simple and immediate.
"Scientific research," to put it bluntly, "generates jobs."' 9' The science of systematics
is so labor-intensive that the task of classifying 10 million species would require
25,000 professional lifetimes.' 92 Whether framed as cooperative bioprospecting or
north-to-south technology transfer for the enrichment of parataxonomy,
commercially oriented initiatives satisfy the Convention on Biological Diversity's
exhortation that the international community should adopt "economically and
socially sound measures ... as incentives" to conserve biodiversity and to contribute
to its sustainable development.' 9'
This much binds proponents and enemies of the biopiracy narrative.
Bioprospecting represents merely one of many tools needed to stem the ongoing
degradation of the global environment. Of this mutually dependent world's
numerous environmental problems, "persistent poverty may turn out to be the
most aggravating and destructive."' 94 We must remember "above all else" that
"human degradation and deprivation.. . constitute the greatest threat not only to
national, regional, and world security, but to essential life-supporting ecological
systems. In environmental protection, as in any other challenge in
international law, "[t]he threat of economic punishment does not deter nations
with nothing to lose.' 96 Under the Biodiversity Convention, "economic and
social development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding
priorities of' developing countries.' 9'
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With cooperation and some measure of good fortune, global north and global
south may yet resolve their differences. The discarding of the biopiracy narrative
would make a good start on this long journey. In the meanwhile, frustrated
partisans on both sides of this debate might do well to heed the wisdom of Mick
Jagger and the Rolling Stones:
You can't always get what you want
You can't always get what you want
You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometime,....
you just might find you get what you need.
98
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